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The ultimate aim of this article is the identifi cation of lessons of paramount impor-
tance derived from the Slovenian experience with the application of EU competition 
law, which can be useful for other (European) countries, in particular for those who 
joined the European Union in the year 2004 or even later. For this reason the au-
thor, fi rstly, offers a short introduction to EU competition law, secondly, he discusses 
its application in Slovenia with special focus on major shortcomings, and fi nally, 
the author offers a combination of several theses, practical suggestions and specifi c 
measures related to the competition policy.
*  Assistant Professor at University of Maribor, Faculty of Law
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. MARKET COMPETITION, AND COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY: 
GENERAL REMARKS
Market competition and the model of market- or social market economy are 
two closely connected concepts. The modern market theories usually describe 
a market competition as an appropriate instrument for stimulation of effi cien-
cy of a given (relevant) market, which is organized according to the model of 
market- or social market economy,1 and therefore as a kind of ‘public good’.
However, in reality the existence of the desired market competition2 is far from 
being a natural market situation.  That is to say, it is not a stable market sit-
uation but rather a labile one, since it demands systematic public protection. 
What is more, in some cases there would be no relevant market competition 
without an appropriate public intervention. Of course, a certain rivalry be-
tween legally and economically independent undertakings, which follow the 
same goal which cannot be achieved at the same time or not in full extent, is 
a natural phenomenon and as such it can be anticipated. Yet, already a glance 
over a daily practice reveals (too) many cases where certain undertakings sim-
ply try to achieve better business result by practicing various unfair business 
practices or by excluding or substantially limiting competition,3 thereby affect-
ing a (relevant) market or other market participants.
Thus, nowadays a market competition is the genuine public concern subject to 
the special law and policy. On one hand, the competition policy deals with the 
defi nition of aims and their ranking, considering also the trade-off, and on the 
other hand, the competition law comprehends a system of legal principles and 
rules aiming at the protection and in some cases even at the creation of market 
competition. Competition law, when observing it in a wide sense, comprehends 
legal principles and rules which aim at the prevention of the a) unfair and b) re-
stricted competition. The former concept is usually absolutely prohibited, i.e. 
there is no exception as to the said prohibition whatsoever. On the contrary, the 
latter concept is merely relatively prohibited, since there are exceptions subject 
1  On the contrary, within the model of state planned economy a market competition is usu-
ally not an ‘issue’ and its role is merely marginal.
2  Or to put more precisely, the existence of the desired type of market competition. Namely, 
in this regard one should distinguish at least between: ‚perfect competition‘, ‚workable competi-
tion‘, and ‚effi cient competition‘. In addition, one can also consider the difference between: ‚actu-
al competition‘ and ‚potential competition‘, ‚competition within the market‘ and ‚competition for 
the market‘, and ‚intra-brand competition‘ and ‚inter-brand competition‘. Last but not least, one 
should also distinguish between: ‚market competition‘ and ‚tender- or bidding competition‘.
3  Additional problem are restrictions of competition performed by public authorities.
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to strict conditions. In addition, one should consider the difference between 
restrictions of competition made by one or more undertakings,4 i.e. restrictive 
co-ordination (agreements, decisions, concerted practices), abuses of domi-
nant position, market concentrations; and by one or more public authorities or 
entities under their dominant infl uence or control such as public undertakings,5 
i.e. state aids, and restrictive or contra-competition market regulations.
1.2. EU COMPETITION LAW: GENERAL REMARKS
EU competition law is traditionally considered as a highly important legal fi eld 
within the corpus of EU law. Namely, from the very beginning of the European 
integration process the ‘system ensuring that competition is not distorted’ was 
largely considered as a precondition for the establishment and proper func-
tioning of the common or internal market. The said function of competition 
and, as a consequence, of the EU competition law remains the same after the 
Lisbon treaty. Namely, although the latter did not include a ‘system of compe-
tition’ among values and aims of the European Union, the Protocol (No 27) 
on the internal market and competition explicitly lays down that the internal 
market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union includes a sys-
tem ensuring that competition is not distorted. Furthermore, the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contains rules on competition, e.g. 
in Articles 101 to 109, which are concretized by the comprehensive secondary 
EU law and, in addition, by the case law and so called soft law.
4  EU competition law employs the so-called functional approach to the defi nition of ‘un-
dertaking’ according to which an undertaking is any entity engaged in at least one economic 
activity regardless of its legal status, way of fi nancing and ownership. See for example cas-
es C-180-184/98 Pavel Pavlov v Stichting Pensionfonds Medische Specialisten [2000] ECR 
I-6451.
For more on the concept of the undertaking and on the related concept of single economic unit see 
for example: Jones, A, The Boundaries of an Undertaking in EU Competition Law, European 
Competition Journal, No. 8(2), 2012, p. 301-331; Jones, A., Sufrin, B., EU Competition Law, 
Text, Cases, and Materials, 4th ed., Oxford University Press, p. 124-141; Whish, R., Competition 
Law, 6th ed., Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 82-95; Quigley, C., European State aid Law and 
Policy, Hart Publishing, 2009, p. 33-41; Lübbig, T., Martín-Ehlers, A., Beihilfenrecht der EU, 
Verlag C.H. Beck, 2009, p. 59-61; Roth, P., Rose, V., Bellamy and Child: European Union Law of 
Competition, 6th ed., Oxford University Press, 2008. p. 92-107; Van de Casteele, K., Hocine, M., 
in: Mederer, W., Pesaresi, N., Van Hoof, M., EU Competition Law, Vol. IV, State Aid, Claeys 
& Casteels, 2008, p. 247-251; Ferčič, A., Hojnik, J., Tratnik, M., Uvod v pravo Evropske unije, 
GV Založba, 2011, p. 181-184.
5  See Art. 2(b) of the Commission Directive 2006/111 of 16 November 2006 on the trans-
parency of their fi nancial relations between Member States and public undertakings as well as 
on fi nancial transparency within certain undertakings, OJ EU, L 318, 17. 11. 2006, p. 17.
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Already a brief examination of the Chapter ‘Rules on Competition’ within the 
TFEU reveals that its provisions aim at the prevention of unlawful restrictions 
of competition, while there are no B2B-rules against unfair competition. How-
ever, this is not to say there are no rules against the unfair competition whatso-
ever within the corpus of EU law. In principle, it is possible relatively credibly 
to assert that individual directives or more generally the secondary EU law 
here and there contains rules against the unfair competition. More disputable 
is, if such rules exist in the primary EU law. According to some legal theorists 
the EU unfair competition law already exists on a primary law basis having 
their foundation in the general provision demanding the ‘system ensuring that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted.6 What is more, according to 
those theorists a clear confi rmation of their assertions can be found within the 
case-law. Yet, despite the judicial practice of the Court of Justice of the EU in 
the fi eld of unfair competition law the said practice is unable to achieve genu-
ine harmonization, since the latter is only possible by means of the legal acts of 
the EU.7 As a matter of fact, vivacious debates of whether there is the EU law 
against unfair competition speak for themselves. There are no such debates as 
regards the EU law against unlawful restrictions of competition. 
I think the EU law does not offer a system of rules, which would systematically 
regulate the unfair competition. Contrary to what was said for the rules against 
unlawful restrictions of competition, the existing (secondary) EU rules only 
partially regulate the unfair competition.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent Member States to adopt or maintain their 
own competition rules, however, these rules shall be strictly in line with the 
EU law, including with the principle of supremacy or primacy. Yet, for some 
anti-competition practices the said principle is further developed or concret-
ized as follows.
Special rules for the relationship between the antitrust rules of the EU and of 
Member States provides Article 3 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 
of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU),8 
which explicitly states, fi rstly, where the competition authorities of the Mem-
ber States or national courts apply national competition law to agreements, 
decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices within the 
6  See for example Glöckner, J. in: Hilty, R.M., Henning-Bodewing, F., Law Against Unfair 
Competition – Towards a New Paradigm in Europe?, Springer, 2007, p. 77-109.
7  See for example Henning-Bodewig, F., in: Hilty, R.M., Henning-Bodewing, F., Law 
Against Unfair Competition – Towards a New Paradigm in Europe?, Springer, 2007, p. 111.
8  OJ EU, L 1, 4. 1. 2013, p. 1.
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meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU which may affect trade between Member States 
within the meaning of that provision, they shall also apply Article 101 TFEU to 
such agreements, decisions or concerted practices, and where the competition 
authorities of the Member States or national courts apply national competition 
law to any abuse prohibited by Article 102 TFEU, they shall also apply Article 
102 TFEU. Secondly, the application of national competition law may not lead 
to the prohibition of agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States but which 
do not restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, or which 
fulfi l the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU or which are covered by a (block ex-
emption) Regulation for the application of Article 101(3) TFEU. Member States 
shall not under this Regulation, i.e. the Regulation 1/2003, be precluded from 
adopting and applying on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or 
sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings. And fi nally, without 
prejudice to general principles and other provisions of the European Union law, 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Regulation 1/2003 do not apply when the competition 
authorities and the courts of the Member States apply national merger or market 
concentration control laws nor do they preclude the application of provisions of 
national law that predominantly pursue an objective different from that pursued 
by Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
Special rules for the relationship between the market concentration control 
rules of the EU and of Member States provides Article 21 of the Council Reg-
ulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings,9 which states, inter alia, no Member State shall apply 
its national legislation on competition to any concentration that has the so-
called European Union dimension.10
On the contrary, in the fi eld of state aids and restrictive or (ex ante) contra-com-
petition market regulation there is no such detailed special regime regulating 
the collision or relationship between confl icting national and supranational 
rules, and consequently, the said collisions, when they occur in practice, are 
‘only’ subject to the general regime as defi ned by the principle of primacy. At 
this point it is also worthy to mention, that all restrictive practices conducted 
directly by public bodies or indirectly, i.e. by their ‘agents’, are mainly regu-
lated by the EU rules, however, with one very important difference, namely, 
the EU state aid control rules are for the most part directly applicable, while 
the EU liberalization rules are usually not since they are mainly included in 
directives (a harmonization tool) which must be implemented or incorporated 
into the Member States’ legal systems by national legislative acts.
9  OJ EU, L 24, 29. 1. 2004, p. 1.
10  The same Article contains limited exceptions to this rule.
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Last but not least, the introductory chapter briefl y considers the sphere of ap-
plication of the EU competition law explained from the substantive (ratio-
ne materiae), personal (ratione personae) and territorial (ratione territoriae) 
point of view.
The EU competition law regulates restrictive practices of: a) single undertak-
ing, i.e. an abuse of dominant position, b) undertakings, i.e. restrictive coor-
dination (agreements, decisions and concerted practices) and market concen-
trations, c) one or more public authorities or public bodies, i.e. state aids and 
restrictive or contra-competition market regulation. 
The said corpus of competition law binds: a) undertakings, both private and 
public, and b) public authorities. In principle, rules preventing unlawful re-
strictive coordination, abuse of dominant position and market concentration 
are addressed to undertakings, while rules preventing unlawful state aids or 
state aids incompatible with internal market, and rules preventing restrictive 
or anti-competition market regulation are addressed to Member States’ public 
authorities (yet, in some cases, the said rules are also addressed to various 
entities under a dominant public infl uence or control). Furthermore, it is also 
worthy to mention that the competition law – in a wide sense – also covers 
rules aimed at the creation or establishment of market competition, in partic-
ular in the network sectors, such as telecommunications, postal services, en-
ergy and transportation sectors, where until the mid-eighties or even later the 
competition was excluded or signifi cantly limited due to the specifi c political 
considerations in the name of a public interest.
The EU competition law shall be applied and enforced within the European 
Union or to put it more precisely, within Member States including also their 
dislocated units according to Article 52 TEU and 355 TFEU. However, in 
certain cases the EU competition law shall not be enforced only by relevant 
public authorities of Member States (and institutions of the European Union), 
but due to the doctrine of extraterritoriality also by non-member states’ organs.
2. THE APPLICATION OF EU COMPETITION LAW IN 
SLOVENIA: SELECTED ISSUES
2.1. THE SLOVENIAN MARKET AND SLOVENIAN LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK
The Slovenian market has undergone a signifi cant transformation. The said 
process started at the beginning of the nineties when a complex shift from the 
state planned economy, where protection of competition was not ‘an issue’, 
to the social market economy, which favours a market competition, began. 
25
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Of course, the said shift was conditional to the prior change of the Slovenian 
Constitution and derived legislation. 
In this regard various constitutional provisions were essential,11 in particular 
guarantee of private property,12 guarantee of free economic initiative or con-
duct,13 and establishment of a system ensuring undistorted market competition.14 
In addition, a comprehensive corpus of legislative acts was adopted,15 regulat-
ing a general protection of market competition and sector specifi c issues in the 
so-called network sectors, e.g. energy, transportation, telecommunication and 
postal services. In these sectors, a market competition was excluded or at least 
signifi cantly limited for almost a half of a century and therefore it was necessary 
to employ a proper liberalization policy aiming at the gradual introduction of 
competition. Of course, the EU-membership has brought a further impetus.
2.2. SLOVENIAN COMPETITION PROTECTION AUTHORITY, 
SECTORAL REGULATORS AND OTHER MARKET ‘GUARDIANS’
It is, however, perfectly clear that even a superior legal framework by itself can-
not deliver desired competition, since the latter has to be effi ciently enforced in 
11  Of course, these provisions are still essential for the organization of the Slovenian market.
12  Article 33 of the Slovenian Constitution: ‘The right to private property and inheritance 
shall be guaranteed.’
13  Article 74(1) of the Slovenian Constitution: ‘ Free economic initiative or conduct shall be 
guaranteed.’
14  Article 74(3) of the Slovenian Constitution: ‘Unfair competition practices and practices, 
which restrict competition in a manner contrary to the law, are prohibited.’
15  In order to illustrate the intensive legislative activity the following, non-exhaustive list of 
relevant legislation is included in this article:
⎯ 1993: Protection of Competition Act, amendments: 2;
⎯ 1994: Slovenian Post Offi ce Act, amendments: 1;
⎯ 1997: Telecommunications Act, amendments: 7, Postal Services Act: amendments: 1;
⎯ 1999: Prevention of Restrictions of Competition Act, amendments: 2, Energy Act, amend-
ments: 8; Railway Transport Act, amendments: 11;
⎯ 2000: State Aid Control Act, amendments: 2;
⎯ 2001: (new) Telecommunications Act, amendments: 2;
⎯ 2002: (new) Postal Services Act-1, amendments: 2;
⎯ 2004: Electronic Communications Act, amendments: 5; Monitoring of State Aids Act, 
amendments: 0;
⎯ 2008: (new) Prevention of Restrictions of Competition Act, amendments: 6;
⎯ 2009: (new) Postal Services Act-2, amendments: 1;
⎯ 2012: (new) Electronic Communication Act-1, amendments: 1;
⎯ 2013: Energy Act-1, pending.
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practice. For that reason various specialized bodies were established,16 i.e. the 
Slovenian Competition Protection Agency, the Market Inspectorate, the State 
Aid Monitor (Ministry of Finance) and various sectoral regulators.
The Slovenian Competition Protection Agency for the most part monitors and 
analyses the Slovenian market, it assesses alleged antitrust17 practices, i.e. it 
assesses the lawfulness of such practices and issues proper administrative acts, 
and following receipt of a notifi cation, it examines whether a concentration 
is compatible with the rules on competition, and after the procedure is con-
cluded, it approves, prohibits or conditionally approves the concentration. In 
addition, it issues opinions on existing or proposed legislative and administra-
tive acts which may restrict the desired competition contrary to the real public 
interest. In principle, the agency’s jurisdiction is extended over all (economic) 
sectors, including over those regulated by sectoral regulators. In this regard no 
signifi cant collisions or tensions have occurred, however, this can be either a 
good or bad sign, namely, if there has been no tension due to the inactivity of 
one or both institutions this certainly cannot be a positive fi nding. Since the 
agency performs vital market functions, it shall enjoy a legal, functional and 
fi nancial autonomy. For that reason the Slovenian competition authority has 
been transformed from an ‘offi ce’ organized within the ministry of economy 
or of economic development and technology, to an independent ‘public agen-
cy’ organized as a self-standing institution existing outside the governmental 
structure. By achieving this long-awaited aim the undesired political infl uence 
on the said authority has been reduced.
The Market Inspectorate is another all-sectors market institution operating 
within the ministry of economy or of economic development and technolo-
gy. Its tasks are not limited only to the protection of market competition but 
rather to the general protection of the Slovenian market. It is also worthy to 
mention that the Market Inspectorate, when protecting competition within the 
Slovenian market, deals only with the unfair business practices meaning that 
there are no activities of the Market Inspectorate in the area of prevention of 
restrictive (business) practices and, as a consequence, there is no overlap of 
tasks entrusted to the Market Inspectorate and to the Slovenian Protection 
Competition Agency. 
16  In addition to classical executive bodies and courts.
17  Is has also certain obligations in accordance with the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 
of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty (now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU), OJ EU, L 1, 4. 1. 2013, p. 1. 
In this regard the agency, inter alia, cooperates with the European Commission and with other 
national competition authorities. 
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The State Aid Monitor is organized as a department within the Ministry of 
fi nance. Its mandate is quiet limited, i.e. predominantly of formal or procedur-
al nature, since it shall: a) handle and assess a notifi cation of state aid across 
all sectors and forward it to the European Commission, b) handle, assess and 
provide an opinion on state aid that entails a block exemption and aid under 
the de minimis rule, c) collect, process and monitor information on state aid 
and on aid granted under the de minimis rule, and administer records of such 
information, d) draw up an annual report, and e) advise managers of state aid. 
The sectoral regulators are organized, inter alia, in network sectors, such 
as telecommunications, postal services, energy, and transportation sectors.18 
Alike the Slovenian Competition Protection Agency various sectoral regula-
tors are organized in the form of self-standing and independent public agen-
cies. In this regard Slovenia had no real choice, since the EU (liberalization) 
law explicitly demanded such independent regulatory bodies within the said 
network sectors,19 what is a rather rare exception from the principle of insti-
tutional autonomy.20 The existence and well-functioning of such independent 
and highly specialized bodies is crucial, considering their regulatory role 
within the market economy. As already said, in the network sectors or parts 
thereof there has been a long-term exclusion or at least signifi cant limitation 
of competition and, as a consequence, various regulatory measures shall fi rst 
of all establish or introduce a market competition as far as possible. By do-
ing this one should, inter alia, carefully consider the important difference 
between ‘de iure’ and ‘de facto’ access to the network or infrastructure, and 
the difference between the competition within the market and competition 
for the market. 
18  As for example the Agency for communication networks and services of the Republic of 
Slovenia (please note: until 22 of January 2014 known as the Agency for Electronic Commu-
nications and Postal services), the Energy agency of the Republic of Slovenia and the Public 
agency of the Republic of Slovenia for railway transport.
19  See for example Art. 35 of the Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity 
and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ EU, L 211, 14. 8. 2009, p. 55), Art. 39 of the Directive 
2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning com-
mon rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC (OJ EU, 
L 211, 14. 8. 2009, p. 94), Article 1(20) of the Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 20 February 2008 amending Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the full 
accomplishment of the internal market of Community postal services (OJ EU, L 52, 27. 2. 
2008, p. 3).
20  See for more on principle of institutional autonomy in Jans, J. H., de Lange, R., Prechal, S., 
Widdershoven, R., Europeanization of Public Law, Europa Law Publishing, 2007, p. 18-22.
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2.3. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF (EU) COMPETITION 
LAW
In principle, it is possible to credibly assert that public enforcement of the (EU) 
competition law in Slovenia is more developed than private one and further, 
that the enforcement of rules preventing restrictive business practices is more 
developed than the enforcement of rules preventing restrictive public author-
ity’s practices. More precisely, according to my personal opinion nowadays21 
the public enforcement of the antitrust is relatively good, however, on the other 
side of the scale there is public enforcement of state aids granted by local 
authorities and public undertakings, while in the middle of the scale there are 
market concentrations and state aids granted by various state authorities. How-
ever, when it comes to private enforcement of rules preventing restrictive prac-
tices even today there is unfortunately relatively little to be proud of. Probably 
the least poor is situation with the private enforcement of antitrust rules, since 
there can be found some positive signs in the sense that the number of damag-
es actions is modestly rising and also the legal argumentation of lawyers and 
judges is getting better and better.22 According to my personal opinion, one of 
the main problems for the said situation is ignorance or lack of knowledge of 
competition law in a daily practice.
 As already said, in the times of the state planned economy the competition 
law was certainly not ‘an issue’, at least not an important one. The legal edu-
cation defi ned by the curricula did not pay much attention to competition law 
and, as a consequence, nowadays those who have studied law approximately 
twenty years ago or even earlier often do not possess suffi cient knowledge of 
competition law. 
Therefore, in a daily practice there is a lot of unintentional violations and, 
what is even more problematic, even those undertakings who are signifi cantly 
affected by the violation of the competition law often do not know they can 
lodge a damage action in this regard. Thus, a well-considered public action 
offering a proper training would be highly welcome. 
21  However, few years ago the situation was rather different, since one could easily get im-
pression the national competition authority has marched throughout the market with eyes 
closed.
22  At least to certain extent this is also a merit of trainings of national judges in the EU competi-
tion law which are co-fi nanced by the European Union. In this regard in particular the Slovenian 
Supreme Court judges attend the said trainings, what is of particular importance.
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2.4. MAJOR SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SLOVENIAN COMPETITION 
POLICY
Considering what was just said, one can easily perceive biggest shortcomings 
of the Slovenian competition policy.23 It is reasonable to start with (too) soft 
institutional support, since appropriate support is fundamental by its very na-
ture. Namely, until recently the Slovenian competition authority was organized 
merely as an ‘offi ce’ within the ministry. Not surprisingly, it lacked real au-
tonomy and, also problematic, it signifi cantly lacked staff or offi cials capacity. 
Probably the best way to illustrate this problem is the fact that at the time of 
the Slovenian entry into European Union approximately only one third of the 
staff needed was available within the then competition authority or ‘offi ce’.24 
Nowadays the situation is better from the organizational point of view since 
the competition authority is organized as a self-standing institution outside the 
governmental structure. However, although the staff defi cit has been gradually 
reduced, but unfortunately not completely suppressed, it still exists and I be-
lieve the said fact can, at least to a certain extent, affect the quality of public 
enforcement of the competition law.
Further defi ciency in the institutional support has been insuffi cient profi ciency 
of general courts of fi rst instance. Unfortunately, there has been no adequate 
public action, since the training of national judges in the EU competition law 
has been predominantly offered by non-governmental bodies mainly within 
the context of the EU (co-)fi nanced projects. Nowadays, the situation seems to 
be a little bit better at least as regards the application the antitrust law, however, 
at the moment it is hard to estimate the situation as regards state the aids law 
since before the Slovenian courts there are still no cases regarding unlawful 
state aids within the meaning of Article 108(3) TFEU (in connection with 
Article 107(1) TFEU). 
With regard to the major shortcomings of the competition policy executed 
by the Slovenian competition authority I would like in particular to point out 
the soft approach dominated, at least until the present fi nancial and economic 
crisis, to the cartelization and market concentrations. The cartelization was 
most problematic within the public procurement of infrastructure projects of a 
high value. Bid rigging was probably most deeply rooted within public works 
procurement, e.g. construction of highways, tunnels and viaducts. However, it 
23  As considered in the wide sense, including not only aims and measures of competition authori-
ties but also aims and measures of legislator and government.
24  According to non-offi cial data.
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seems that these conducts will be properly assessed.25 Similar can be said for the 
detected cartels in the banking and energy sector. On the other hand, compara-
ble soft approach dominated in the fi eld of market concentrations establishing or 
preserving oligopoly structures in various relevant markets. The said approach 
or policy is by its very nature problematic since the Slovenian market is small 
and prone to oligopolies. It is commonly accepted and undisputable that oligop-
olies are in principle undesired since they encourage cartelization and, what is 
more, they make diffi cult for competition authority or competitors to prove car-
tels because of the oligopoly defence.26 In addition, I believe more could be done 
in order to improve the relatively modest use or take of the leniency programme.
When it comes to the policy preventing public restrictions of competition one 
could easily recognize problems in the fi eld of state aids granted by local au-
thorities and public undertakings.27 Generally, the Slovenian public sector’s 
understanding of the state aid law is thrillingly low, and I believe additional 
powers of the Slovenian state aid monitor and its stricter (ex offi cio) control, 
accompanied by training of offi cials or employees could improve the said 
shortcoming. It is safe to assume the costs of such public activity could be 
lower than costs caused by the mass unlawful state aids or state aids which are 
incompatible with the internal market. Furthermore, the liberalization policy 
should be improved. First of all, Slovenia shall timely and properly implement 
the ‘outstanding’ directives to avoid (further) actions or procedures before the 
Court of Justice of the European Union.28 In addition, more or less all sec-
25  The Competition Protection Agency’s administrative procedure is already fi nished, while 
not all possible judicial procedures (in this regard) are. Namely, consider the (possible) admin-
istrative dispute procedure, damages procedure and criminal procedure.
26  For more on oligopoly defence see Jones, A., Sufrin, B., EU Competition Law, Text, Cas-
es, and Materials, 5th ed., Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 712; Middleton, K., Rodger, B., 
MacCulloch, A., Galloway, J., Cases and Materials on UK and EC Competition Law, 2nd ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 211.
27  This is, however, not to say there are no problems with state aids granted by state authori-
ties. Let us take for example the recapitalization of Elan, i.e. European Commission’s decision 
from 19 of September 2012 (SA.26379 (C 13/2010)), at the moment pending case before the 
General Court (T-27/13).
28  Consider for example the following cases: 
⎯ C-627/10 European Commission v. Republic of Slovenia [2013] not yet published [rail 
sector], 
⎯ C-8/13, European Commission v. Republic of Slovenia, pending [energy sector: electricity], 
and 
⎯ C-9/13, European Commission v. Republic of Slovenia, pending [energy sector: gas].
At this point one should also consider several European Commission’s actions concerning the 
implementation of the directives regulating rail and electronic communications sectors which 
have been withdrawn.
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toral regulators could do more in order to achieve effi cient competition within 
‘their’ markets.
Last but not least, there are also some reserves in the fi eld of preventing un-
fair competition or business practices.29 As one could anticipate from the 
above-mentioned facts and explanation, the private enforcement is relatively 
modest. What is more, also public enforcement seems to be less developed 
than desired. Namely, the prosecution of unfair business practices is reserved 
for the Market inspectorate. Its powers are not limited to the protection of 
competition only but rather to the general protection of the market, and some-
times it seems the protection of fair competition is not among its priorities. 
Without prejudice to thorough (non-existing) analysis I believe it would be ap-
propriate to consider the possibility to change the division of powers between 
the Slovenian Competition Protection Agency and the Market Inspectorate in 
a manner that also the unfair competition would be entrusted to the former, 
of course, under the crucial condition that the agency would acquire suffi cient 
staff capacities. 
In short, unfortunately the Slovenian competition policy – although one can 
recognize certain improvements – has been proved as one having substantial 
shortcomings, mainly due to lack of experience with the social market econ-
omy. However, today there should be no more excuses in this regard since 
Slovenia has more than twenty years of experience with the model of social 
market economy, and ten years of experience with the European Union and its 
law. Namely, the said shortcomings directly or indirectly affect various groups 
of persons, like for example consumers in terms of price and performance; 
competitors or honest undertakings; our market or competitiveness of the Slo-
venian economy in comparison to other economies; and last but not least, our 
public fi nances and, consequently, the Slovenian taxpayers. Thus, I believe 
there are more than enough reasonable grounds to take the competition law 
and policy far more seriously in the future (starting now).30 
29  For general overview of the unfair competition law in Slovenia see for example Grilc, P., in: 
Hilty, R.M., Henning-Bodewing, F., Law Against Unfair Competition – Towards a New Para-
digm in Europe?, Springer, 2007, p. 221-231.
30  If a certain state chooses the model of social market economy it should more or less follow its 
‘logic’, otherwise the model will not deliver desired results. Of course, a state, at least theoretical-
ly, can instead of the model of market economy or social market economy choose something 
else, namely, a model that is not founded on market (forces) and competition or at least not 
signifi cantly, however, this article is not intended to discuss such models and their logic.
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3. CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CASE OF 
SLOVENIA
The case of Slovenia or its competition policy is instructive since it offers some 
useful lessons and experience.31 In general, it demonstrates the importance of 
legal, functional and fi nancial autonomy of national market institutions since 
proper institutional support is a condition sine qua non for an effi cient applica-
tion of the competition law. This thesis is of particular importance in times of 
the present fi nancial and economic crisis since widely accepted austerity mea-
sures aim, inter alia, at the reduction of public administration. Of course, staff 
reductions within institutions which are responsible for the market protection 
and development can cause more costs than savings,32 therefore all measures in 
this regard should be carefully considered on a case-by-case basis. 
A further thesis having general and all-sectors nature is that a private enforce-
ment shall be effectively stimulated. Due to their limited resources, in a daily 
practice, public institutions cannot deal with all breaches of the competition 
law. To be accurate this is even not their mission since they protect public 
interest. Moreover, one should distinguish the concept of penalty from that of 
restitution damages.
In the fi eld of antitrust law special attention shall be dedicated to the car-
telization and in particular to public procurement in order to prevent bid 
rigging. However, not only a bid rigging but also each public procurement 
as such shall be carefully considered and performed since it means a market 
intervention capable to distort the market competition, which is different 
from the tender- or bidding competition.33 In this regard among disposable 
types of procurement procedures, one should favour the most competitive 
types. Further emphasis in the said fi eld shall be on an effi cient leniency 
programme. For this reason a well-recognised, trustworthy and transparent 
system shall be established.
31  Some of them are discussed within this article, however, this is not to say other practices, 
not mentioned in the article, are not problematic.
32  Similar can be said for a reduction of wages since this can lead to undesired loss of experts. 
What is more, a levelling of wages in public administration is highly questionable since not all 
entities or units of public administration are equally important for proper functioning of the 
state or society. The model of social market economy demands effi cient market institutions 
and quality of their work is closely connected with the professional capacity of public employ-
ees who work within such institutions.
33  See for example Graells, A.S, Public Procurement and Competition: Some Challenges 
Arising from the Recent Developments in EU Public Procurement Law, available at: http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206502, 2013, p. 1-39.
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In the fi eld of market concentrations generally the oligopoly structures shall 
not be created or maintained. This is in particular true for small economies 
like Slovenia, which are in principle prone to oligopolies by the very nature, 
and therefore even more careful structural policy is needed.
In the fi eld of the liberalization law, I would particularly like to point out the 
importance of the new paradigm. Namely, the state’s ownership role should 
be left behind in favour of the regulatory role. This is certainly not to say the 
former role shall be completely abandoned,34 since the Article 345 TFEU is 
neutral as regards the public property meaning that, inter alia, public under-
takings as such are not automatically incompatible with the EU law. However, 
they shall in principle act according to a common business logic or better to 
say, according to normal market conditions and to the EU legal framework.
And fi nally, in the fi eld of the state aid law a proper monitoring at the national 
and local level seems to be essential. The said state aids monitoring shall also 
embrace state aids granted by local authorities and public undertakings,35 not 
only those granted by the state in the narrow sense, and the said monitoring 
shall consider more than just subsidies; it shall also embrace state aids granted 
through classical market transactions such as recapitalizations, privatizations, 
public procurements, loans, guarantees, etc.
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